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Abstract
We design and analyze minimax-optimal algorithms for online linear optimization
games where the player’s choice is unconstrained. The player strives to minimize regret,
the difference between his loss and the loss of a post-hoc benchmark strategy. The
standard benchmark is the loss of the best strategy chosen from a bounded comparator
set. When the the comparison set and the adversary’s gradients satisfy L∞ bounds, we
give the value of the game in closed form and prove it approaches
√
2T/π as T →∞.
Interesting algorithms result when we consider soft constraints on the comparator,
rather than restricting it to a bounded set. As a warmup, we analyze the game with a
quadratic penalty. The value of this game is exactly T/2, and this value is achieved by
perhaps the simplest online algorithm of all: unprojected gradient descent with a constant
learning rate. We then derive a minimax-optimal algorithm for a much softer penalty
function. This algorithm achieves good bounds under the standard notion of regret for
any comparator point, without needing to specify the comparator set in advance. The
value of this game converges to
√
e as T →∞; we give a closed-form for the exact value
as a function of T . The resulting algorithm is natural in unconstrained investment or
betting scenarios, since it guarantees at worst constant loss, while allowing for exponential
reward against an “easy” adversary.
1 Introduction
Minimax analysis has recently been shown to be a powerful tool for the construction of online
learning algorithms [Rakhlin et al., 2012]. Generally, these results use bounds on the value
of the game (often based on the sequential Rademacher complexity) in order to construct
efficient algorithms. In this work, we show that when the learner is unconstrained, it is often
possible to efficiently compute an exact minimax strategy.
We consider a game where on each round t = 1, . . . , T , first the learner selects xt ∈ Rn,
and then an adversary chooses gt ∈ G ⊂ Rn, and the learner suffers loss gt · xt. The goal
of the learner is to minimize regret, that is, loss in excess of that achieved by a benchmark
strategy. We define
Regret = Loss− (Benchmark Loss) =
T∑
t=1
gt · xt − L(g1, . . . , gT ) (1)
1
as the regret with respect to benchmark performance L (the L intended will be clear from
context). Letting I(x ∈ X ) = 0 for x ∈ X and ∞ otherwise, the standard definition of regret
arises from the choice
L(g1, . . . , gT ) = inf
x∈Rn
g1:T · x+ I(x ∈ X ), (2)
the loss of the best strategy in a bounded convex set X (we write g1:t =
∑t
s=1 gs for a sum
of scalars or vectors). When L depends only on the sum G ≡ g1:T we write L(G). We will
be able to interpret the alternative benchmarks L we consider as penalties Ψ on comparator
points, so L(G) = argminxG · x+Ψ(x), where Ψ(x) has replaced I(x ∈ X ) in Eq. (2).
We view this interaction as a sequential zero-sum game played over T rounds, where the
player strives to minimize Eq. (1), and the adversary attempts to maximize it. We study
the value of this game, V T , and design minimax optimal algorithms for the player; formal
definitions are given below. Some results are more naturally stated in terms of rewards rather
than losses, and so we define Reward = −Loss = −∑Tt=1 gtxt.
Outline and Summary of Results Section 2 provides motivation for the consideration
of alternative benchmarks L. Section 3 then develops several theoretical tools for analyzing
unconstrained games with concave benchmark functions L. Section 4 applies this theory to
three particular instances; Figure 1 summarizes the results from this section. These games
exhibit a strong combinatorial structure, which leads to interesting algorithms and perhaps
surprising game values.
Section 4.1 serves as a warmup, where we show that constant step-size gradient descent is
in fact minimax optimal for a natural choice of L, which can be though of as replacing the hard
feasible set X in Eq. (2) with a quadratic penalty function on comparator points. Section 4.2
provides results analogous to those of Abernethy et al. [2008]; we consider regret compared
to the best x˚ where ‖x˚‖∞ ≤ 1 against an adversary constrained to play ‖gt‖∞ ≤ 1, while
Abernethy et al. considered ‖gt‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖x˚‖2 ≤ 1 for n ≥ 3 dimensions. Interestingly,
while we prove results for the unconstrained player, we show the optimal strategy in fact
always plays points from X = {x | ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1}, and so applies to the constrained case as well.
Our results hold for the n = 1 case (where L2 and L∞ coincide), showing that the value of
the game approaches
√
2T/π as T → ∞, as opposed to √T as one might extrapolate from
the results of Abernethy. This indicates an interesting change in the geometry of the L2
game between n = 1 and n = 3. Finally, Section 4.3 gives a minimax optimal algorithm for
the setting introduced by Streeter and McMahan [2012]. Following their work, our algorithm
obtains standard regret at most O(R√T log ((1 +R)T )) simultaneously for any comparator
x˚ with |˚x| = R, without needing to choose R in advance. However, we emphasize a slightly
different interpretation of this setting, discussed in Section 2. It is worth noting that the regret
(relative the the respective L) of these algorithms is O(T ), O(√T ), and O(1), respectively,
though all three are minimax algorithms.
The Minimax Value of the Game Given a benchmark function L, the minimax value
of the game is
V T =
〈
inf
xt∈Rn
sup
gt∈G
〉T
t=1
(
T∑
t=1
gt · xt − L(g1, . . . , gT )
)
(3)
2
setting L(G) Ψ(˚x) minimax value update
soft feasible set −G2
2σ
σ
2
x˚2 T
2σ
xt+1 =
1
σ
g1:t
standard regret −|G| I(|˚x| ≤ 1) →
√
2
pi
T Eq. (12)
bounded-loss betting − exp(G/√T ) −√T x˚ log(−√T x˚) +√T x˚ → √e Eq. (15)
Figure 1: Summary of online linear games considered in this paper. Results are stated
for the one-dimensional problem where gt ∈ [−1, 1]; Corollary 2 gives an extension to n
dimensions. The benchmark L is given as a function of G = g1:T . The standard notion of
regret corresponds to the L(G) = argminx∈[−1,1] g1:t · x = −|G|. The benchmark functions
can alternatively be derived from a suitable penalty Ψ on comparator points x˚, so L(G) =
argminxGx+Ψ(x).
where
〈
infxt supgt
〉T
t=1
is a shorthand notation for infx1 supg1 . . . infxT supgT . Against a worst-
case adversary, any algorithm must incur regret at least V T , and the minimax optimal al-
gorithm will incur regret at most V T against any adversary. Since in this work we study
minimax algorithms, we will often use the value of the game V T as an upper bound on
Regret (as defined in Eq. (1)). Generally we will not assume our adversaries are minimax
optimal.
We are also concerned with the conditional value of the game, Vt, given x1, . . . xt and
g1, . . . gt have already been played. That is, the Regret when we fix the plays on the first
t rounds, and then assume minimax optimal play for rounds t + 1 through T . However,
following the approach of Rakhlin et al. [2012], we omit the terms
∑t
s=1 xs · gs from Eq. (3).
We can view this as cost that the learner has already payed, and neither that cost nor the
specific previous plays of the learner impact the value of the remaining terms in Eq. (1).
Thus, we define
Vt(g1, . . . , gt) =
〈
inf
xs∈Rn
sup
gs∈G
〉T
s=t+1
(
T∑
s=t+1
gs · xs − L(g1, . . . , gT )
)
. (4)
Note the conditional value of the game before anything has been played, V0(), is exactly V
T .
Related Work Regret-based analysis has received extensive attention in recent years; see
Shalev-Shwartz [2012] and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] for an introduction. The anal-
ysis of alternative notions of regret is also not new. In the expert setting, there has been
much work on tracking a shifting sequence of experts rather than the single best expert; see
Koolen et al. [2012] and references therein. Zinkevich [2003] considers drifting comparators
in an online convex optimization framework. This notion can be expressed by an appro-
priate L(g1, . . . , gT ), but now the order of the gradients matters, unlike the benchmarks L
considered in this work. Merhav et al. [2006] and Dekel et al. [2012] consider the stronger
notion of policy regret in the online experts and bandit settings, respectively. For investing
scenarios, Agarwal et al. [2006] and Hazan and Kale [2009] consider regret with respect to
the best constant-rebalanced portoflio.
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More recently, the field has seen minimax approaches to online learning. Abernethy and Warmuth
[2010] give a minimax strategy for several zero-sum games against a budgeted adversary. Sec-
tion 4.2 studies the online linear game of Abernethy et al. [2008] under different assumptions,
and we adapt some techniques from Abernethy et al. [2009]. Rakhlin et al. [2012] takes pow-
erful tools for non-constructive analysis of online learning problems and shows they can be
used to design algorithms; our work differs in that we focus on cases where the exact minimax
strategy can be computed.
2 Alternative Notions of Regret
One of our contributions is showing that that interesting results can be obtained by choosing
L differently than in Eq. (2); in particular, we obtain minimax optimal algorithms for the
problem considered by Streeter and McMahan [2012] by analyzing an appropriate choice of
L.
One could choose L(G) = 0, but this leads to an uninteresting game: the adversary has
no long-term constrains, and so can simply pick gt to maximize gtxt for whatever xt the
player selected. Thus, the player can do no better than always picking xt = 0. This is exactly
the reason for studying the standard notion of regret: we do not require that we do well in
absolute terms, but rather relative to the best strategy from a fixed set.
That is, interesting games result when the player accepts the fact that it is impossible to
do well in terms of the absolute loss
∑
t gt ·xt for all sequences g1, . . . , gT . However, the player
can do better on some sequences at the expense of doing worse on others. The benchmark
function L makes this notion precise: sequences for which L(g1, . . . , gT ) is large and negative
are those on which the player desires good performance,1 at the expense of allowing more
loss (in absolute terms) on sequences where L(g1, . . . , gT ) is large and positive. The value of
the game V T tells us to what extent any online algorithm can hope to match the benchmark
performance L. It follows by definition that if we add a constant k to L (making L easier to
achieve), we decrease the minimax value of the game by k, without changing the minimax
optimal strategy.
We can use these ideas to derive algorithms for a setting that is quite different from typical
online convex optimization. On each round t, the world (possibly adversarial, possibly not)
offers the player a betting opportunity on a binary outcome; the player can take either side of
the bet. The player begins with $1, but on later rounds can wager up to whatever amount he
currently has (based on previous wins and losses). The player selects an amount xt to bet, and
then the world reveals whether the bet was won or lost; if the player won the bet, he receives
xt dollars; otherwise, he loses xt dollars. The players net winnings are −
∑
t gtxt, where
gt ∈ {−1, 1}; the player wins the bet when sign(xt) 6= gt (thus, the player strives to minimize∑
t gtxt). How should the player bet in this game? Clearly if the world is adversarial, we
cannot do better than always betting xt = 0. But, we might have reason to believe the world
is not fully adversarial; if we knew gt = 1 with a fixed probability p, then following a Kelly
betting scheme [Kelly Jr, 1956] might be appropriate, but knowing p is often unrealistic in
practice.
If the player is familiar with online linear optimization, he might try projected online
1It can be useful to think about −L(G) as the benchmark reward for the sequence with gradient sum G.
4
gradient descent [Zinkevich, 2003] with a constant step size.2 If we restrict our bets to the
feasible set [−B,B], letting G = g1:T , this algorithm guarantees Regret = Loss + B|G| ≤
2B
√
T . Then Winnings = −Loss ≥ B|G| − 2B√T . Thus in the best case (when |G| = T )
the player ends up with a little less than BT ; but he can lose up to B
√
T when G = 0. Thus,
to ensure he loses no more than the $1 he has on hand, he must choose B = 1/
√
T . With
this restriction, in the best case the player wins less than
√
T dollars. However, the post-hoc
optimal strategy would have been to bet everything every round, netting winnings of 2T .
Despite the theoretical guarantees, the player certainly might feel regret at having won only√
T in this situation!
One might also hope to use online algorithms for portfolio management, for example those
of Hazan and Kale [2009] and Agarwal et al. [2006]. However, these algorithms require the
assumption that you always retain at least an α > 0 fraction of your bet, which is directly
violated in our game.
By carefully crafting a suitable benchmark function L, we can provide the player with
a more satisfying algorithm. Ideally, we would like an L that satisfies three properties: 1)
there exists an algorithm where regret is bounded by a constant ǫ (for any T ) with respect
to L, 2) −L(G) ≥ 0, and 3) −L(G) grows exponential in |G|. Properties 1) and 2) ensure
the player never loses more than ǫ running this algorithm; by scaling the bets the algorithm
suggests by 1/ǫ, he can ensure he never loses more than his starting $1. Property 3 implies
that for “easy” sequences, we get exponential reward; in fact, given 1) and 2) we would like
−L(G) to grow as quickly as possible.
Of course, if the adversary chooses gt uniformly at random from {−1, 1} each round,
we expect to frequently see |G| ≥ √T , and so intuitively we will not be able to guarantee
exponential winnings. This suggests the best we might hope for is a function like L(G) =
− exp
( |G|√
T
)
. In fact, in Section 4.3 we show that constant regret against such a benchmark
function is possible, and we derive a minimax algorithm.
A Comparator Set Interpretation The classic definition of regret defines L indirectly
as the loss of the best strategy from a fixed class X in hindsight, Eq. (2). As this work shows,
it can be advantageous to state L as an explicit function of G; however, useful intuition can
be gained by interpreting L as a penalty function on comparator points x˚. That is, we wish
to find a Ψ such that
L(G) = argmin
x
Gx+Ψ(x).
For the benchmark functions L we consider, we also derive the corresponding penalty func-
tions Ψ using convex conjugates. These are summarized in our results in Figure 1.
The standard notion of regret correspond to a hard penalty Ψ(x) = I(x ∈ X ). Such a
definition makes sense when the player by definition must select a strategy from some bounded
set, for example a probability from the n-dimensional simplex, or a distribution on paths in
a graph. For such problems, standard regret is really comparing the player’s performance to
that of any fixed feasible strategy chosen with knowledge of g1, . . . , gT ; by putting an equal
penalty on each of them, we do not indicate any prior belief that some strategies are more
likely to be optimal than others.
2Any other algorithm that provides a bound on standard regret of O(B√T ) will behave similarly.
5
However, in contexts such as machine learning where any x ∈ Rn corresponds to a valid
model, such a hard constraint is difficult to justify; while any x ∈ Rn is technically feasible,
in order to prove regret bounds we compare to a much more restrictive set. As an alternative,
in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 we propose soft penalty functions that encode the belief that points
near the origin are more likely to be optimal (we can always re-center the problem to match
our beliefs in this reguard), but do not rule out any x ∈ Rn a priori.
3 General Unconstrained Linear Optimization
In this section we prove a theorem that greatly simplifies the task of computing minimax
values and deriving algorithms for the games we consider. We prove this result in the one-
dimensional case; Corollary 2 then extends the result to n-dimensions.
Theorem 1. Consider the one-dimensional unconstrained game where the player selects
xt ∈ R and the adversary chooses gt ∈ G = [−1, 1], and L is concave in each of its arguments
and bounded below on GT . Then,
V T = E
gt∼{−1,1}
[− L(g1, . . . , gT )].
where the expectation is over each gt chosen independently and uniformly from {−1, 1} (that
is, the gt are Rademacher random variables). Further, the conditional value of the game is
Vt(g1, . . . , gt) = E
gt+1,...,gT∼{−1,1}
[− L(g1, . . . , gt, gt+1, . . . gT )]. (5)
Proof. We argue by backwards induction (from t = T to t = 1) on the conditional value of
the game, with the induction hypothesis that
Vt(g1, . . . , gt) = E
gt+1,...,gT∼{−1,1}
[−L(g1, . . . , gT )], (6)
and further that Vt is convex in each of its arguments and bounded above on GT . The
induction hypothesis holds trivially for T = t, using the assumption that L is concave and
bounded below for the second part. Now, suppose the induction hypothesis holds for t. We
then have (by the definition of Vt)
Vt−1(g1, . . . , gt−1) = inf
xt
sup
gt
gtxt + Vt(g1, . . . , gt−1, gt).
Note Vt−1 must be convex in each of it’s arguments, using the induction hypothesis on Vt.
Let M(g, x) = gx + Vt(g1, . . . , gt−1, g). We would like to appeal to the minimax theorem to
switch the inf and sup, but since M is convex in g (using the induction hypothesis) rather
than concave, we cannot do so immediately. However, because we are choosing gt ∈ [−1, 1],
it follows from the convexity of M that the supremum is obtained at either −1 or +1. Thus,
we can write
Vt−1(g1, . . . , gt−1) = inf
xt
sup
gt∈[−1,1]
M(gt, xt)
= inf
xt
sup
gt∈{−1,1}
M(gt, xt)
= inf
xt
sup
pt∈∆({−1,1})
E
gt∼pt
[M(gt, xt)],
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where pt ∈ [0, 1] is the probability the adversary chooses gt = +1 (otherwise, gt = −1). Now
Egt∼pt[M(gt, xt)] is linear in both pt and xt, and so we can apply the minimax theorem (e.g.,
Theorem 7.1 from Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006]), which gives
Vt−1(g1, . . . , gt−1) = sup
pt∈∆({−1,1})
inf
xt
E
gt∼pt
[gtxt + Vt(g1, . . . , gt−1, g)]
= sup
pt∈∆({−1,1})
inf
xt
E
gt∼pt
[gtxt] + E
gt∼pt
[Vt(g1, . . . , gt−1, gt)].
Now, the adversary (sup player) must choose pt = 0.5 so E[gt] = 0, or otherwise the player can
choose xt to drive the value to −∞ (since Vt is bounded above). Thus, the first expectation
term disappears, and the choice of the player becomes irrelevant, giving
Vt−1(g1, . . . , gt−1) = E
gt
[Vt(g1, . . . , gt−1, gt)],
where now the expectation is on gt drawn i.i.d. from {−1, 1}. Applying the induction
hypothesis completes the proof, since then iterated expectation yields Eq. (6) for Vt−1, and
boundedness is immediate.
The use of randomization to allow the application of the minimax theorem is similar to
the technique used by Abernethy et al. [2009].
A key insight from the proof is that an optimal adversary can always select from {−1, 1}.
With this knowledge, we can view the game as a binary tree of height T . An algorithm for the
player simply assigns a play x ∈ R to each node, and the adversary chooses which outgoing
edge to take: if the adversary chooses the left edge, the player suffers loss x, otherwise the
player wins x (suffers loss -x). Finally, when leaf ℓ is reached, the adversary pays the player
some amount L(ℓ). Theorem 1 implies the value of the game is then simply the average value
of −L(ℓ).
Given Theorem 1, and the fact that the functions L of interest will generally depend
only on g1:T , it will be useful to define BT to be the distribution of g1:T when each gt is
drawn independently and uniformly from {−1, 1} (that is, the sum of T Rademacher random
variables).
Theorem 1 immediately yields bounds for games in n-dimensions where the adversary is
constrained to play ‖gt‖∞ ≤ 1:
Corollary 2. Consider the game where the player chooses xt ∈ Rn, and the adversary chooses
gt ∈ [−1, 1]n, and the total payoff is
T∑
t=1
gt · xt −
n∑
i=1
L(g1:T,i)
for a concave function L. Then, the value of the game is
V T = n E
G∼BT
[− L(G)],
Further, the conditional value of the game is
Vt(g1, . . . , gt) =
n∑
i=1
E
Gi∼BT−t
[− L(g1:t,i +Gi)].
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Proof sketch. The proof follows by noting the constraints on both players’ strategies and the
value of the game fully decompose on a per-coordinate basis.
A recipe for minimax optimal algorithms in one dimension For any function L,
E
G∼BT
[L(G)] =
1
2T
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
L(2i− T ), (7)
since 2−T
(
T
i
)
is the binomial probability of getting exactly i gradients of +1 over T rounds,
which implies T − i gradients of −1, so G = i− (T − i) = 2i− T .
Since Eq. (5) gives the minimax value of the game if both players play optimally from
round t+ 1 forward, a minimax strategy for the learner on round t+ 1 must be
xt+1 = argmin
x∈R
max
g∈{−1,1}
g · x+ Vt+1(g1, . . . , gt, g)
=
1
2
(
Vt+1(g1, . . . , gt,−1) − Vt+1(g1, . . . , gt,+1)
)
. (8)
The second line follows because the argmin is simply over the max of two intersecting linear
functions, which we can compute in closed form as the point of intersection. Thus, if we can
derive a closed form for Vt(g1, . . . , gt), we will have an efficient minimax-optimal algorithm.
In the next section, we explore cases where this is possible.
When L depends only on G = g1:T , we may be able to run the minimax algorithm
efficiently even if Vt does not have a convenient closed form: if τ = T − t, the number of
rounds remaining, is small, then we can compute Vt exactly by using the appropriate binomial
probabilities (following Eq. (5) and Eq. (7)). On the other hand, if τ is large, then applying
the Gaussian approximation to the binomial distribution may be sufficient.
4 Deriving Minimax Optimal Algorithms
In this sections, we explore three applications of the tools from the previous section. We
begin with a relatively simple but interesting example which illustrates the technique.
4.1 Constant step-size gradient descent can be minimax optimal
Suppose we use a “soft” feasible set for the benchmark,
L(G) = min
x
Gx+
σ
2
x2 = − 1
2σ
G2, (9)
for a constant σ > 0. Does a no-regret algorithm against this comparison class exist? Unfor-
tunately, the general answer is no, as shown in the next theorem:
Theorem 3. The value of this game is V T = EG∼BT
[
1
2σG
2
]
= T2σ .
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Proof. Starting from Eq. (7),
E
G∼BT
[G2] =
1
2T
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
(2i− T )2 Eq. (7)
=
1
2T
(
4
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
i2 − 4T
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
i+ T 2
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
))
and since
∑T
t=0
(
T
t
)
= 2T ,
∑T
t=0
(
T
t
)
t = T2T−1,
∑T
t=0
(
T
t
)
t2 = (T + T 2)2T−2,
=
1
2T
(
4(T + T 2)2T−2 − 4T (T2T−1) + T 22T
)
= (T + T 2)− 2T 2 + T 2 = T.
The result then follows from linearity of expectation.
This implies Reward ≥ −L(G)−Regret = 12σ
(
G2−T ), a fact noted by Streeter and McMahan
[2012, Lemma 2].
Thus, for a fixed σ, we cannot have no a regret algorithm with respect to this L. However,
if T is known in advance, we could choose σ =
√
T in order to claim no-regret. But this is a
bit arbitrary: if the player could pick σ, and cares purely about Regret, obviously he would
like to play the game where σ → ∞, as that makes the value of the game (Regret) as small
as possible. However, this choice also drives Reward to zero. If the lower-bound on reward
is what matters, then the player should choose based on how he expects G2 to relate to T .
To derive the minimax optimal algorithm, we can compute conditional values (using
similar techniques to Theorem 3),
Vt(g1, . . . , gt) = E
G∼BT−t
[ 1
2σ
(g1:t +G)
2
]
=
1
2σ
(
(g1:t)
2 + (T − t)),
and so following Eq. (8) the minimax-optimal algorithm must use
xt+1 =
1
4σ
((
(g1:t − 1)2 + (T − t− 1)
) − ((g1:t + 1)2 + (T − t− 1)))
=
1
4σ
(−4g1:t) = − 1
σ
g1:t
Thus, a minimax-optimal algorithm is simply constant-learning-rate gradient descent with
learning rate 1
σ
. Note that for a fixed σ, this is the optimal algorithm independent of T ; this
is atypical, as usually the minimax optimal algorithm depends on the horizon (as we will see
in the next two cases).
4.2 Optimal regret against hypercube adversaries
Abernethy et al. [2008] gives a minimax optimal algorithm when the player’s xt and the
comparator x˚ are constrained to an L2 ball, and the adversary must also select gt from an
L2 ball, for n ≥ 3 dimensions.3 In contrast, we consider regret compared to the best x˚
3Their results are actually more general than this, allowing the constraint on ‖gt‖2 to vary on a per-round
basis. Our work could also be extended in that manner.
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constrained to the unit L∞ ball, but allow the player to select any xt ∈ Rn; our adversary is
constrained to select gt from the unit L∞ ball (the generalization to arbitrary hyper-rectangles
is straightforward). Perhaps surprisingly, the optimal strategy for the player always plays
from the unit L∞ ball as well, so our results immediately apply to the case of the constrained
player.
Since we consider L∞ constraints on both the comparator and adversary, Corollary 2
implies it is sufficient to study the one-dimensional case. We consider the standard notion of
regret, taking L(G) = −|G| following Eq. (2). Our main result is the following:
Theorem 4. Consider the game between an adversary who chooses loss functions gt ∈ [−1, 1],
and a player who chooses xt ∈ R. For a given sequence of plays, x1, g1, x2, g2, . . . , xT , gT , the
value to the adversary is
∑T
t=1 gtxt−|g1:T |. Then, when T is even with T = 2M , the minimax
value of this game is given by
VT = 2
−T 2M T !
(T −M)!M ! ≤
√
2T
π
.
Further, as T →∞, VT →
√
2T
pi
.
Proof. Letting T = 2M and working from Eq. (7),
V T = − E
G∼BT
[L(G)] =
2
2T
T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
|i−M | = 2M
2T
(
2M
M
)
= 2−T
2M T !
(T −M)!M ! , (10)
where we have applied a classic formula of de Moivre [1718] for the mean absolute deviation
of the binomial distribution (see also Diaconis and Zabell [1991]). Using a standard bound
on the central binomial coefficient (based on Stirling’s formula),(
2M
M
)
=
4M√
πM
(
1− cM
M
)
(11)
where 19 < cM <
1
8 for all M ≥ 1, we have
V T ≤ 2M 1√
πM
=
√
2T
π
.
As implied by Eq. (11), this inequality quickly becomes tight as T →∞.
The minimax algorithm (for the constrained player, too!) In order to compute the
minimax algorithm, we would like a closed form for
Vt(Gt) = − E
Gτ∼Bτ
[
L(Gt +G
τ )
]
,
where Gt = g1:t is the sum of the gradients so far, τ = T − t is the number of rounds to
go, and and Gτ = gt+1:T is a random variable giving the sum of the remaining gradients.
Unfortunately, the structure of the binomial coefficients exploited by de Moivre and used in
Eq. (10) does not apply given an arbitrary offset Gτ . Nevertheless, we will be able to derive
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a formula for the update that is readily computable. Writing Prτ (b) for the probability a
random draw from Bτ has value b, the update of Eq. (8) becomes
xt+1 =
1
2
τ∑
b=−τ
Prτ (b)
(
|Gt + b− 1| − |Gt + b+ 1|
)
.
Whenever Gt + b ≥ 1, the difference in absolute values is −2, and whenever Gt + b ≤ 1, the
difference is 2. When Gt + b = 0, the difference is zero. Thus,
xt+1 =
1
2
(Prτ (b > −G)(−2) + Prτ (b < −G)(2))
= Prτ (b < −G)− Prτ (b > −G). (12)
While this update does not have a closed form, it can be efficiently computed numerically.4
It follows from this expression that even though we allow the player to select xt+1 ∈ R, the
minimax optimal algorithm always selects points from [−1, 1]. Thus, we have the following
Corollary:
Corollary 5. Consider the game of Theorem 4, but suppose now we also constrain the player
to choose xt ∈ [−1, 1]. This does not change the value of the game, as the minimax algorithm
for the unconstrained case always plays from [−1, 1] regardless.
Abernethy et al. [2008] shows that for the linear game with n ≥ 3 where both the learner
and adversary select vectors from the unit sphere, the minimax value is exactly
√
T . In-
terestingly, in the n = 1 case (where L2 and L∞ coincide), the value of the game is lower,
about 0.8
√
T rather than
√
T . This indicates a fundamental difference in the geometry of
the n = 1 space and n ≥ 3. We conjecture the minimax value for the L2 game with n = 2
lies somewhere in between.
4.3 Non-stochastic betting and No-regret for all feasible sets simultane-
ously
We derive a minimax optimal approach to the betting problem presented in Section 2, which
also corresponds to the setting introduced by Streeter and McMahan [2012]. Again, it is
sufficient to consider the one-dimensional case. In that work, the goal was to prove bounds
like Regret ≤ O(R√T log ((1 +R)T )) simultaneously for any comparator x˚ with |˚x| = R.
Stating their Theorem 1 in terms of losses, this bound is achieved by any algorithm that
guarantees
Loss =
T∑
t=1
gtxt ≤ − exp
( |g1:T |√
T
)
+O(1). (13)
Note that whenever |g1:T | is large compared to
√
T the algorithm must achieve significantly
negative loss (positive reward).
4The CDF of the binomial distribution can be computed numerically using the regularized incomplete beta
function, from which Prτ (b ≤ −G) can be derived. Then, Prτ (b = −G) can be computed from the appropriate
binomial coefficient, leading to both needed probabilities.
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We initially study the game where
L(G) = − exp
(
G√
T
)
(14)
(note G = g1:T ∈ [−T, T ] can be positive or negative). We prove the minimax algorithm
achieves
∑T
t=1 gtxt − L(g1:T ) ≤
√
e, implying Reward = −∑Tt=1 gtxt ≥ exp( G√T
)
− √e.
Thus, this algorithm guarantees large reward whenever the gradient sum G is large and
positive. In order to satisfy Eq. (13), we must also achieve large reward when G is large
and negative. Since L(g1:t)+L(−g1:t) ≤ − exp
(
|g1:T |√
T
)
, this can be accomplished by running
two copies of the minimax algorithm simultaneously, switching the signs of the gradients and
plays of the second copy. We formalize this in Appendix A.
Interpretation as a soft feasible set Before developing an algorithm it is worth noting
an alternative characterization of this benchmark function. One can show, that for a ≥ 0,
min
x∈R−
(Gx− ax log(−ax) + ax) = − exp
(
G
a
)
Thus, if we take Ψ(x) = −ax log(ax) + ax+ I(x ≤ 0), we have
min
x∈R−
g1:Tx+Ψ(x) = − exp
(
G
a
)
.
Since this algorithm needs large Reward when G is large and positive, we might expect that
the minimax optimal algorithm only plays xt ≤ 0. Another intuition for this is that the
algorithm should not need to play any point x˚ to which Ψ assigns an infinite penalty. This
intuition is confirmed by the analysis of this “one-sided” algorithm:
Theorem 6. Consider the game with benchmark L as defined in Eq. (14). The minimax
value of this game is exactly
V T =
(
1 + exp
(
2√
T
))T
2T exp
(√
T
) ≤ √e,
and further limT→∞ V T =
√
e. Letting τ = T − t be the number of rounds left to be played,
and defining Gt = g1:t, the conditional value of the game is
Vt(Gt) = 2
−τ exp
(
Gt − τ√
T
)(
1 + exp
(
2/
√
T
))τ
,
which leads to the minimax optimal algorithm5 for the player
xt+1 = −2−τ exp
(
Gt − τ − 1√
T
)(
exp
(
2√
T
)
− 1
)(
exp
(
2√
T
)
+ 1
)τ
≤ 0. (15)
5When computing the player’s strategy via Eq. (15), it is numerically preferable to do the calculation in
log-space, and then exponentiate to get the final play.
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Proof. First, we compute the value of the game:
V T = E
G∼BT
[− L(G)] = 2−T T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
exp
(
2i− T√
T
)
= 2−T exp
(−√T ) T∑
i=0
(
T
i
)(
exp
(
2/
√
T
))i
= 2−T exp
(−√T )(1 + exp (2/√T))T ,
where we have used the ordinary generating function,
∑T
i=0
(
T
i
)
xi = (1 + x)T . Manipulating
the above expression for the value of the game, we arrive at V T = cosh(1/
√
T )T . Using
the series expansion for cosh leads to the upper bound cosh(x) ≤ exp(x2/2), from which we
conclude
VT =
(
cosh
(
1/
√
T
))T ≤ exp( 1
2T
)T
=
√
e.
Using similar techniques, we can derive the conditional value of the game, letting τ = T−t
be the number of rounds left to be played:
Vt(Gt) = 2
−τ
τ∑
i=0
(
τ
i
)
exp
(
Gt + 2i− τ√
T
)
= 2−τ exp
(
Gt − τ√
T
)(
1 + exp
(
2/
√
T
))τ
.
Following Eq. (8) and simplifying leads to the update of Eq. (15). It remains to show
limT→∞ VT =
√
e. Using the change of variable x = 1/
√
T , equivalently we have limx→0 cosh(x)
1
x2 .
Examining the log of this function,
lim
x→0
log
(
cosh(x)
1
x2
)
= lim
x→0
1
x2
log cosh(x) = lim
x→0
1
x2
(
x2
2
− x
4
12
+
x6
45
− 17x
8
2520
+ . . .
)
=
1
2
,
where we have taken the Maclaurin series of log cosh(x). Using the continuity of exp, we have
lim
x→0
(
cosh(x)
1
x2
)
= exp
(
lim
x→0
log
(
cosh(x)
1
x2
))
=
√
e.
A strong lower-bound Recall from Section 2 that as long as −L(G) ≥ 0 and we get
constant regret with respect to L, we can scale our bets so that we never risk losing more
than a constant starting budget. This holds for any number of rounds T against any adversary.
Given that constraint, we would like −L(G) to grow as fast as possible, so it is natural to
consider the generalizing Eq. (14) as
Lα(G) = − exp
(
G
Tα
)
for α ∈ (0, 12 ]. Following the techniques used in the preceding proof, we can show for this
game
V Tα = E
G
[L(G)] = 2−T exp
(−T 1−α) (1 + exp (2T−α))T = cosh (T−α)T .
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By taking the first term in the series for log cosh x, namely x2/2, and plugging in x = 1/Tα ≤
1, we get a good upper bound on the value of the game:
V T = exp
(
T log cosh(T−α)
) ≤ exp(T 1
2T 2α
)
= exp
(
1
2
T 1−2α
)
This implies that, for any α < 1/2, no algorithm can provide constant loss (that is,
∑T
t=1 gtxt ≤
k for a constant k ≥ 0) for any sequence while also guaranteeing
Reward = −
T∑
t=1
gtxt = Ω
(
exp
(
G
Tα
))
(16)
for any α < 1/2. In fact, for α < 1/2, no algorithm can guarantee even linear loss in the
worst case while making the reward guarantee of Eq. (16).
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A A Symmetric Betting Algorithm
The one-sided algorithm of Theorem 6 has
Loss = V T + L(G) ≤ − exp
(
G√
T
)
+
√
e.
In order to do well when g1:T is large and negative, we can run a copy of the algorithm
on −g1, . . . ,−gT , switching the signs of each xt it suggests. The combined algorithm then
satisfies
Loss ≤ − exp
(
G√
T
)
− exp
(−G√
T
)
+ 2
√
e
≤ − exp
( |G|√
T
)
+ 2
√
e,
and so following Eq. (13) and Theorem 1 of Streeter and McMahan [2012], we obtain the
desired regret bounds. The following theorem implies the symmetric algorithm is in fact
minimax optimal with respect to the combined benchmark
LC(G) = − exp
(
G√
T
)
− exp
(−G√
T
)
.
Theorem 7. Consider two 1-D games where the adversary plays from [−1, 1], defined by
concave functions L1 and L2 respectively. Let x
1
t and x
2
t be minimax-optimal plays for L1
and L2 respectively, given that g1, . . . gt−1 have been played so far in both games. Then
x1 + x2 is also minimax optimal for the combined game that uses the benchmark LC(G) =
L1(G) + L2(G).
Proof. First, taking τ = T − t and using Theorem 1 three times, we have
V C(g1, . . . , gt) = − E
Gτ∼Bτ
[
L1(g1:t +G
τ ) + L2(g1:t +G
τ )
]
= − E
Gτ∼Bτ
[
L1(g1:t +G
τ )
]− E
Gτ∼Bτ
[
L2(g1:t +G
τ )
]
= V 1(g1, . . . , gt) + V
2(g1, . . . , gt),
using linearity of expectation. Then, using Eq. (8) for each of the three games, we have
xCt = argmin
x
max
g
gx+ VC(g1, . . . , gt−1, g)
=
1
2
(
VC(g1, . . . , gt−1,−1)− VC(g1, . . . , gt−1,+1)
)
=
1
2
(
V1(g1, . . . , gt−1,−1) + V2(g1, . . . , gt−1,−1)− V1(g1, . . . , gt−1,1 )− V2(g1, . . . , gt−1,+1)
)
= x1t + x
2
t ,
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